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Introduction
The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history
is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of
the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the
intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected
issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical
age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this
concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come
to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are
themselves historically enveloped?
But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has
dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really
neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of
wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things
ofour world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important
2to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply
derail the possibility for historical understanding.
Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not
question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating
knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true,
or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts
and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just
determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge
could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of
"historical anarchy"!'
Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted
to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of
historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal
presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating
to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past
which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the
present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the
meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely
ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by
I
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3including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this
in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for
him includes the question of the Being of history.
One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get
from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a
science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of
history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on
historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of
history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's
Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we
shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the
conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception
means for a contemporary historical understanding.
The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually
has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist
interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover
metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many
thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth
in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We
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exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware of the historicity of
the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we
actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as
communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal?
Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus
overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical
horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological
concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a
metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the
ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there
can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "co-
historical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-world-
with-Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's
solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a
subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal
measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's
notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things
as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is
explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des Seins).
5Chapter 1
In announcing the age ofhistorical consciousness, Wilhelm Dilthey forewarns of an
impending crisis. His bold declaration of the coming of a new way of thinking also
heralds in a new opportunity. The state of historical thinking that existed a mere
hundred and fifty years before Dilthey did not indicate the depth to which knowledge,
both in its possibility and certainty, could be challenged. A new world replete with
promise and problems had indeed emerged.
Previous to his century, historical questioning centered around a teleological
Christian theology which placed God's plan at the center of both discussion and
methodology. Even the rediscovered classical thinking of the ancient Greeks did not
consider man outside ofhis 'natural' place within the polis. Arising out of this milieu
.j
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6Voltaire coined the phrase 'philosophy of history' and stimulated a rationalistic
discussion based upon an individualistic and de-Christianized conception of history.
Previous to this, was Vico' s philosophy of history which set nations in the center of
history but failed to establish an historical method for the analysis of the complete
human condition.
Dilthey's critical theory ofhistory emerged out of the backdrop of the speculative
philosophies ofhistory ofHerder and Hegel and the positivistic empirical history of
Ranke. Kant's idealism with its a priori principles did not recognize humankind's
inalienable historical immersion. Today it is unthinkable to claim a complete
understanding of the human condition in isolation from past claims of such complete
knowledge. All action and all thought have roots in an earlier period, emerging out
of an historical template of previous thought and action. Recognizing the human
struggle within this historico-existential immersion, Dilthey formulated the question
ofhistory as it relates to humanity: "Here we touch on the most fundamental fact of
the human sciences: the historicity of psychic life as it is manifested in every system
ofculture produced by man. How is the sameness ofour human nature, as expressed
in uniformities, related to its variability, its historical character?" 1 Historical reason
lWilhelm Dilthey, "Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters:
Baudsteine fur eine Poetik" (1887) from Gesammelte Schriften vol.VI
pps. 103-241, quoted from "The Imagination of the Poet: Elements of
.. j
7had thus arrived on the philosophical scene, and all previous claims to knowledge
must answer Dilthey's challenge.
Dilthey produced such a large and varied corpus of work that disagreements as
to his central thought still remain. His 100,000 pages are generally not regarded as
consisting of a single focused thesis or a single approach, instead his work develops,
revealing a multifaceted approach arising out ofhis understanding ofthe hermeneutic
process. Accordingly, the intention of this chapter is to cover points specifically
relating to his theory of history and not to investigate either his methodology or
philosophic works as a whole. At this point it should be made clear that although it
is now correct to label a critical analysis of history a 'critical philosophy of history',
Dilthey did not see his critique ofhistorical reason in this light. Nor did he think that
the synthesis of many sciences on the basis of historical accounts could ultimately
lead to a 'speculative philosophy ofhistory'. Thus this chapter will look at Dilthey's
historical project as a theory of the restrictiveness of historical thought and not as a
philosophy of history. First to be examined will be his idea of the connection and
difference between the natural sciences and "human studies". Secondly, his
a Poetics" trans. Louis Agosta & Rudlf A. Makkreel, in Poetry and
Ex~erience, from Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works vol.V, eds. Rudolf
A.Makkreel & Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1985) p. 35.
8conception of the "objective mind" will be treated. Finally we must ask, given
Dilthey's experiential approach to historical knowledge, what avenues are open for
a philosophy of history.
Despite the fact that human acts are particular whereas sciences deal with the
general, Dilthey thinks that the sciences of humans (Geisteswissenschaften) are
possible. In fact, history as one of the human sciences fulfils an important role
retelling human deeds in a way that satisfies the human spirit. Dilthey's project to
elevate and philosophically justify this knowledge, posited that historians provide a
unique knowledge of human living not provided by science or by art. In order to
substantiate this claim he first needed to determine the object of historical science.
The well determined object of the natural sciences, since the time of Aristotle and
Plato, was considered the unchangeable universal. Indeed, scientific thinking along
these lines allowed the modern era incredible success in predicting events and
controlling the environment: true knowledge became scientific knowledge in many
people's minds. Historical information did not provide such incontrovertible proof
of its power, leaving its legitimacy in jeopardy: Henry Ford's famous quote, "History
is more or less bunk",2 expresses the prevailing attitude of the times.
2Dictionary of Quotations 3rd ed., (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1979) c.v Henry Ford.
9Dilthey's notion of the SCIences of the spirit, or "Human Studies"
(Geisteswissenschaften) , had much to demonstrate in order that they be seen to
possess the ability to provide knowledge. Dilthey began by differentiating the
categories of scientific thought which involve such things as concepts of substance
and force (which are irrelevant to human studies), from categories of human studies
which involve categories of meaning, values, significance and purpose.3
According to Theodore Plantinga,4 early in his career Dilthey divided the studies
between "sciences of the external world" and "sciences of Geist". However, this
fuzzy distinction was as unsatisfactory as that between universals and particulars.
Platinga suggests that Dilthey could not accept Rickert's method of differentiating
between a generalizing or universalizing way of looking at things in conjunction with
a value theory. This method could not escape a subjectivist and therefore inadequate
distinction between the sciences.
The categories of the human studies, Dilthey came to think, rely not on the
3Wilhelm Dilthey, "Plan der Fortsetzung zum aufbau der
Geschichtlichen WeI t in den Geisteswissenshaften" (1910) from
Gesammelte Schriften vol.VII pps. 191-220, quoted from "The
Construction of the Historical World in the Human Studies" in ~
Dilthey Selected Writings, ed. & trans. H.P.Rickman (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1976) p. 212.
4Theodore Plantinga, Historical Understanding in the Thought
of Wilhelm Dilthey, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980)
pps. 24-30.
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content of the study nor on the approach to analyzing the data, but on the way that
humans experience the subject-matter. Following this approach Dilthey came to use
the word Erlebnis, which has its roots in Leben - life - to characterize the objects of
history. Erlebnis, or life-experience, is an inner experience involving the entire mind
and is not just a sensory experience or outside learning (Erfahrung). Plantinga quotes
Dilthey from his treatise of 1894 "Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic
Psychology" :
Now the Geisteswissenschaften are distinguished from the
natural sciences first of all by the fact that the latter
have as their object facts that enter consciousness from
without, as phenomena, and as given singly, whereas the
facts of the former sciences enter consciousness in an
originary way from within, as a reality and as a living
coherence. From this it follows that the coherence of
nature presented by a combination of hypotheses. For
the Geisteswissenschaften, by contrast, it follows that
the coherence of mental life, as something originally
given, is everywhere their basis. We explain nature, but
we understand mental life.5
Here we have a secure basis on which to distinguish between the sciences and their
respective categories. Knowledge based on the natural sciences is supplemented by
SWilhelrn Dilthey, "Ideen iiber eine beschreibende und
zergliedernde Psychologie" from Gesammelte Schriften vol.V
pps. 143-4, trans. T.Plantinga, quoted in Plantinga, Historical
Understanding p. 33.
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a unity that we provide; it receives its coherence from us. Knowledge based on the
human studies does not rely on a coherence from outside but the connections are
immediately given, that is, without mediation. Arriving at a conclusion on the nature
of the object of historical study, we see a fundamental difference between the
"explanation" of the natural sciences and the "description" of the human studies.
This difference between explanation and description is detailed in Dilthey's
psychology. Without reference to psychology Dilthey thinks that the human studies
would lack the coherence of a system. His contention was that the materialist
psychology of his time can never really explain the human experience without
grounding both the explanation and the experience in a broader metaphysical
context. We can not fully describe what an island is, without for example, also
describing what water is, and thus how the one defines the boundaries of the other.
Psychology for Dilthey is descriptive psychology. No longer a natural science it has
moved from explaining human actions to describing the whole mental life.
Intelligence, emotional life and acts of will, which are linked together in
consciousness can be studied only in relation to the products of the outer historical
world. Laws, myths and language, reveal composite connections already existent in
the human that can be apprehended and reveal their meaning without masking the
experience by artificial and ambiguously defined categories.
12
A fundamental comparison between Geisteswissenshaften and the natural sciences
is that in the natural sciences there is a hierarchy of sciences: mathematics is at the
top, followed by physics and chemistry which are dependent on the levels above
etc.... This is not the case in the human studies. Here explanation according to fixed
relations gives way, without losing expressive power, to description based on the
mutual dependence of all parts. The relationship between eternal truths, lived
experience and historical understanding are bound up together. When the whole is
dependent on the particular and the particular is dependent on the whole, the
unravelling process of discovery takes time and effort:
The knowledge of the whole of historical and social
reality...realizes itself gradually in a system of
truths, based on epistemological reflection, wherein, on
the basis of the theory of man, the special theories of
social reality are built up, and these are applied in a
true progressive historical reality which is bound up in
the interactions ofindividuals...World history, in so
far as it is not beyond human power altogether, would
form the colophon of the whole of the human studies.6
According to Dilthey, the human studies comprIse many individual unitary
6Wilhem Dilthey "Ubersicht Uber den Zusammenhang der Einzel
Wissenshaften des Gei tes, in Welcher die Notwendigkei t einer
Grundlegenden Wissenshaft Dargetan Wird" from Gesammelte Schriften
vol.I pps. 92-5, quoted in H.A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm
Dilthey, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952) pps. 191-92.
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disciplines, including history, economics, law, politics and psychology and the study
of religion, literature, poetry, architecture, music and philosophic world views and
systems. Since history, in its very nature, is an aspect in each of the other human
studies, history and the totality of human studies together form a twin-star of study,
each dependent on the 'gravity' of the other for stability and cohesion; each of "these
can be talked about and described and theories can be developed about them; but they
always refer to the same fact...the human-social-historical reality... the study of
history and the systematic human studies, are, throughout, dependent on each other
and form a solid whole".7 Specifically, Dilthey sees that the human studies are based
on the historicality ofhumans, Erlebnis and as such are woven into a common sphere
which he calls the "objectification oflife".8 Thus Dilthey argues that the Erlebnis,
apprehending directly the outer historical world, is a direct reflection of the
connections within both the outer world and inner experience. We discover the
nature of the outer world by close attention to the inner experience of that outer
world.
7Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Construction of the Historical World in
the Human Studies" (1910) from Gesammelte Schriften vol.VII p. 191,
in H. P . Rickman, ed. & trans., Dilthey: Pattern and Meaning in
History (New York: Harper, 1962) p. 68.
8Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Construction of the Historical World in
the Human Studies" (1910) from Gesammelte Schriften vol.VII
pps. 130-66, included in Rickman, Selected Writings, p. 191.
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Dilthey's idea of the objectification of life needs some clarification. Although "it
surrounds us constantly" it is not to be considered a metaphysical idea nor a
mysterious mystical sphere. Rather it represents the totality of the culture in which
we as humans reside and out of which we project our existence. We are at home in
this "historical and understood realm" comprised of things as diverse as the
"distribution of trees in a park, the arrangement of houses in a street, the functional
tool of an artisan, the sentence pronounced in the courtroom".9 The mind creates
facts and can only understand what it has created, thus the totality of that which it
understands, in and through lived-experience, is the objectification of life - the zenith
and completion of the human studies.
It is only with personal experience that one can come to an understanding of the
subject matter of the human studies, the objectification of life. Dilthey asserts that
there are two classes of truth, experiencing and understanding. The mutual
dependence ofthe two classes oftruth promotes a widening ofexperience in response
to understanding and a widening of understanding in response to experience: "The
progressive widening-out requires ever new general truths for the comprehension of
this world ofspecific events. At the same time, the extension ofthe historical horizon
9Ibid., p. 192.
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makes the formation of ever more general and fruitful concepts possible." 10 Via this
process of ever expanding and unfolding layers of understanding and possible
experience, humans become aware of themselves and others. The facts thus created,
because they are man-made and historical, open up the possibility ofarriving at a full
appreciation and description of the human experience. Unlike inflexible and
schematic explanations of the physical world which tend to constrict and confine
human experience into their categories, historical understanding allows, in fact
encourages, a personal responsibility within the Erlebnis. Thus from this we can see
that an individual's lived experience can never be fully defined because ultimately
it depends upon an individual's participation until the moment of death.
Dilthey also refers to the objectification of life as an "objective mind". This
objective mind he explicitly distinguishes from Hegel's 'objective mind'. Whereas
Hegel's idealist program constructed "communities from the universal, rational
will ...Hegel constructed metaphysically; we analyze the given...we must start from
the reality of life" 11 Dilthey recognized the fragility of a system based upon the
sometimes illusionary and suffering dark instincts of man. However, in the human
studies based upon his psychology of description, truth or meaning must start from
lOIbid., p. 190.
llIbid., p. 194.
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an historical reality. Thus the objective mind can not, in the interest of fairness and
integrity to the human condition, exclude the more ephemeral aspects of life - art,
religion and philosophy.
Individuals and communities form this "outer realm of mind" and "whatever
characteristics of its own the mind puts into expressions today, are, tomorrow, if they
persist, history". 12 History is an unfolding, an accumulation of meanings in which
even the philosophical schools ofrationality and empiricism are but reflections ofthe
state ofthe objectification of life at any given moment. Humankind's position within
the objective mind is a profound yet tenuous connection to a nebulous dynamic
reality:
In the objective mind, past ages, in which the great,
total forces of history have taken shape, are
contemporary reality. The individual, as bearer and
representative of the great feature interwoven in him,
enjoys and grasps the history in which they arose. He
understands history because he himself is a historical
being. 13
Here we see Dilthey placing humans into the fabric ofhistory, both as a product and
a creator of history. Specifically it is the products of the mind, as well as of past and
12Ibid., p. 192.
13Ibid., p. 195.
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present ages, that constitute the historical world.
Using the objectification of life itself as "an additional basis for the human
studies", experience and understanding of it "disclose the mind-constructed world" .14
The mind-constructed world is gradually comprehended as a synthesis and
cooperation of interdependent systems of interactions. The mind's dynamic structure
contains, what Dilthey calls, an immanent teleological character. This innate
character creates values and determines the importance of concepts which will then
provide the basis for communal interaction. Thus the mind's self-interaction as
transcending itself towards some purpose infuses the historical world with value.
Combinations of individual viewpoints form the units ofthe human studies which
are then 'woven into' nations and ages. Yet it is from behind this horizon of a
national or temporal unity ofaction that human actions arise: "The common practices
of an epoch become the norm for the activities of individuals who live in it" .15 It is
here, within the mind-constructed world, that Dilthey raises the question ofa possible
philosophy of history:
14 I bid., p. 191 - 5 .
15Ibid., p. 198.
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So the direct relationship between life with its values
and purposes and history is replaced by scholarly concern
with general validity. We must seek the inherent
relationship between productive power, values, purposes,
meaning and significance within the historical system of
interactions. Only on the basis of such objective
history do these questions arise: is prediction of the
future possible and, if so, how far?16
What is specifically sought is that which constitutes the dynamism within the mental
life. Dilthey thinks that in any given historical age there exists a unified conception,
or an inner core, around which experience and understanding reflect upon and are
reflected by. Knowledge of specific events and general truths, Dilthey claims
"develop" within this historical age. But what is the nature of this development
process? Can we escape the flux and mutual dependence of understanding and
experience to grasp this development itself? Thus the question arises, which
ultimately remains unanswered by Dilthey: how does the inherent relationship
develop?
Dilthey's methodological analysis of history begins with an analysis from an
individual human study by singling out concrete connections within that particular
discipline. Using this type of analysis as a basis, a systematic view of all the human
16Ibid., p. 198.
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studies and of history itself becomes possible. H.A. Hodges points to two relations
that a scientific examination of historical and social life must investigate: "the
relations between one state of society and another which comes before or after it in
time, i.e. the laws of historical change; and the relations between the different
branches of social life and activity at anyone moment in time" .17 Hodges continues,
expressing Dilthey's opinion, that "such comprehensive formulae are beyond our
contrivance". Dilthey argued that overarching theories, that is a philosophy of
history, covering multiple disciplines within the human studies, were not within his
purview because they were not plausible. Yet Dilthey repeatedly speaks about
regularities and generalizations, an "inherent relationship", and so we should think
of this goal of discovering general truths as a distant, if unstated, dream. The
fundamental problem in arriving at these general truths is that the unit of history is
the "psycho-physical person"18 whose experiences as lived-experiences cannot be
measured nor are they ultimately subsumed under the explanatory categories of the
natural sciences: those of unity and multiplicity, whole and part, synthesis and
interaction. Because every experience is an inner experience and reflects only
17H.A.Hodges, Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, p. 188.
18Wilhelm Dil they, II The Construction of the Historical World
in the Human Studies ll quoted in Rickman Selected Writings, p. 201.
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individual mental states, attitudes and relations, each generalization made is an
individual generalization and thus not really a generalization at all! Dilthey,
predominantly concerned with the comprehension ofindividuality, must reconcile the
fact that even though individuals have differences they nevertheless share common
features. Dilthey remains adamant that because of the nature of historical persons,
general laws are impossible: "Every change of situation changes life as a whole.
Similarly the whole of life is active in any expression which we comprehend. This
is why neither experience nor understanding present us with homogeneous systems
in which laws of change can be discovered" .19 On this point Dilthey seems to have
overstated the point. Although every moment is indeed a totally new world, it is not
a new world in every way, at least we do not experience each new moment as a
completely new world. Thus we can see this as a warning to simplistic philosophies
of history which do not take into consideration the dynamic reality of the world.
In his role as a literary historian, Dilthey concretely describes his theory of the
mind-constructed world, showing a world of individual minds individually creating:
When memory, life-experience, and its intellectual
content are used to raise the relations of life, value,
and significance to the level of the typical; when an
19Ibid., p. 202.
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event is made the bearer and symbol of something
universal; and when ends or values become ideals, what is
expressed in this universal content of the literary world
is not knowledge of reality, but the most vivid
experience of the interconnectedness of our existential
relation in the meaning of life.20
The literary world for Dilthey represents a sub-system of the human studies as a
whole. From out of the literary and artistic world comes a description of the
historical spirit or the "spirit of the age".
Despite differences between various disciplines of the human studies there are
sometimes parallels, as is the case where both the political world of statesmen and
transcendent world of the poets live in an historical situation that contains "a
multiplicity of particular facts" .21 For the statesman, distributions of water, land,
mountains, and original variations ofhuman beings are forged into a purposive unity;
whereas the artist joins together life, thought and the striving of life. Dilthey credits
a genius of an age with understanding and representing the "nexus" of an age and by
means ofa creative power produces unity out ofthe multiplicity of facts. This model
2°Wilhelm Dilthey, "Goethe and the Poetic Imagination" from Das
Erlebnis und die Dichtung (1910) trans. Christopher Rodie, in
Poetry and Experience, p. 238.
21Wilhelm Dilthey, "Imagination of the Poet" from Poetry and
Experience, p. 161.
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relating facts together into a whole, if successful will "always become[..] the model
for many others [relationships]".22 Thus it appears that the process of generating
"reciprocities and affinities" between various disparate facts in one discipline throws
open possibilities for unity in other areas. A unified historical spirit is comprised of
models of unity and these models of unity then widen-out the boundaries of the
historical spirit which then, through a genius, generates new models and so on.... In
the mind-constructed world, Dilthey has in fact pointed out a possible general law
describing, in experience, a method how the inherent relationship develops.
Here we should review the position of Dilthey. Firstly he distinguishes sharply
between the agendas of the natural sciences and the human sciences. While basing
the human sciences in the empirical or 'existential' world, secondly he distinguishes
two types of psychological knowledge that are received from the two sciences:
explanation comes from the natural sciences, description from the human sciences.
This indicates that meaning arises only out of the lived experience of humans while
the strictly empirical information that we get from the hard sciences explains but
gives no meaning or understanding of our world. Thirdly, meaning and
understanding are enmeshed in the historical world, the "objective mind", which
22Ibid., p. 162.
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serves as our window through which we describe and thus understand our world --
our mind-constructed world. The question remains as to whether it is possible to
either explain or understand the manner in which the historical world itself unfolds
or develops. Since the connections between scientific explanation and historical
meaning are themselves interwoven, the task of discovering the mechanism of a
"widening-out" of an historical-world gets complicated.
Dilthey wholeheartedly places humans in the context of the whole of reality and
hints at a possible solution. "Here, organic life must, according to the evolutionary
character of all known reality, be viewed as an intermediary link between inorganic
nature and the historical world and thus a preliminary stage of the latter".23 Dilthey
thinks that we should approach lived experiences disinterestedly indicating that in
order to fully appreciate our situation in the world, we must distance ourselves from
ourselves in order to correctly see ourselves. This is difficult because, as Dilthey
points out, humans are constantly informed by a teleological system which invariably
induces us to read into situations our own historical motivations, recognizing things
that fall into this system and that "which does not fit this teleological system fall[s]
23Wilhelm Dil they, "Construction of the Historical World" from
Gesammelte Schriften vol. VII pps. 189-200, quoted in Rickman,
Selected Writings, p. 213.
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away without effect" .24 Furthermore, we are locked into the language of our times
and our very concepts condition and determine "down to inscrutable depths" the
expression of experience. Thus it remains difficult to separate disinterestedly our
position as intermediary link between the realm of the inorganic empirical and the
unitary historical world.
Tempering his teleological idea in comparison with either a religious or Hegelian
teleology, Dilthey waters down any purposive end, replacing end with process: "The
structural system does not work out a determinate purpose; it merely contains
purposiveness" .25 The way to disinterestedness remains open though clouded.
Hodges discusses subjective and objective angles on immanent teleology, paralleling
Dilthey's separation of descriptive and explanatory psychology;
"subjectively...mental processes work together to bring about the satisfaction of our
instincts, or 'happiness'; objectively...they work to secure the survival of the
individual and the species [which is] borrowed from biology".26 The empirical
24Wilhelm Dilthey, "Ubersicht Uber den Zusammenhang" from
Gesammelte Schriften vol. I p. 53, quoted in Hodges, Philosophy of
Wilhelm Dilthey, p. 158.
25Wilhelm Dilthey, "Construction of the Historical World" from
Gesammelte Schriften vol.VII pps. 329-330, quoted in Hodges, The
Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, p. 44.
26Wilhelm Dilthey, "Ideen iiber eine beschreibende und
zergliedernde Psychologie" from Gesammelte Schriften vol.V
25
scientific world and the historical world are bound together and they each operate
with purpose, the purpose of the scientific world allows us to survive but has no
meaning and the historical world guides us toward meaning and a reason to carryon.
By remaining conscious ofthe limitation ofthe scientific approach, Dilthey thinks
that we can derive a clearer understanding of the undivided existence of the human
being. The scientific and human studies merely discover different appearances ofone
thing. Science observes the natural world with its ideas of causal chains and regular
materialist processes, yet because humans live and depend upon this context of
nature, the human studies to some extent rely on the natural sciences for raw material.
This also provides a clue as to how understanding functions in other more humanistic
disciplines of thought. Stressing that we must know the physical empirical world in
order to know this condition, Dilthey sets a condition for the determination of the
development of mental life. The human sciences are dependent on the facts of the
natural sciences for data and the natural sciences are dependent on the human studies
for a meaning of that data, thus there is a "double relationship" between the sciences.
In every age the raison d'etre changes. In the modem era, new ideas of cosmic
development pushed aside ancient notions of the unchangeability of the universe and
pps. 200-13, quoted in Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey,
p. 209.
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swept through eighteenth century Europe bringing In its wake the idea of
developmental history. Dilthey recognized the dissolution of the Romanized forms
of natural social systems with the advent of the idea of developmental history that
was started in the eighteenth century by Hume, Kant, Lamarck, Lessing and Herder.
The profound consequence resulting from startling empirical studies of primitive
people (and civilized nations) revealed with utmost clarity the complete moldability
of human world-views. The destruction which befell these primitive peoples'
societies was presaged when civilized nations' faith in the universal validity of any
cogent system of concepts to express world order was itself completely overturned.
Dilthey expressed this new change in direction: "Philosophy must seek its inner
coherence not in the world but in man" .27
Developmental history, empirically linked with the natural theory of evolution,
crushed absolutism in religion and philosophy. This created the problem ofhistorical
anarchy: "The evolutionary theory which thus originated is necessarily linked to the
knowledge ofthe relativity ofevery historical form of life... so the same development
of historical consciousness which did such a destructive job on the great systems
27Wilhelm Dil they, "Die Typen der Wel tanschauung und Ihre
Ausbildung in den Metaphysischen Systemen" from Gesarnmelte
Schriften vol.VIII pps. 75-118, "The Types of World-views and their
Development in Metaphysical Systems" included in Rickman, Selected
Writings, p. 135.
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must help us to eliminate the hard contradiction between the claim to universal
validity in every philosophical system and the historical anarchy of these systems" .28
In response, we must come to understand and interpret based on our total lived
experience within an historical era. Historical reason destroys absolutes, yet
Dilthey's hermeneutic approach by enclosing experience within itself as the basis of
meaning provides each individual a path out of anarchy. And through individual
reflection upon his age, it provides society with meaning. Dilthey hints that the
double relationship between the sciences presents a method by which historical
anarchy can be met.
We can thus see humans immersed in a web of relationships between the
scientific relations of inorganic matter, the evolutionary process of organic life and
the uniquely human 'neo-evolutionary' process of the human studies where each
person can will their own adjustments to the meaning of reality. Nevertheless, we
must also appreciate that the 'neo-evolutionary' process must itself be understood in
historical terms relating to an individual person as historically located.
Thus we have recounted Dilthey's theory of history and are now able to situate
his thought into the problem at hand, that of existence within a common historical
28Ibid., p. 136.
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world vis-a-vis individual actors. According to Dilthey, any attempt at understanding
historicality is based upon the lived-existence of each human within a larger world
of historical unfolding. The notion of world is an expanding notion which is
concretized as the "objectivity of life" or the "objective mind" and is a response to the
dynamic flow of ideas. This flow ultimately constitutes Dilthey's historicality.
Humans recognize this flow first as empirically explained (scientific) and then as
given a meaning by describing for themselves the content of this historical
experIencIng.
The common world represented by the "objective mind" is a composite of the
things and ideas that have been passed down and recognized within the current
historical age and is woven into the human as a series of practices yet at the same
time is reacting to the creative power of human genius. Dilthey suggests that the
cogency of the world can not come from outside of the world but, rather, can be
found only in the human. It is our teleological tendency that impells a scientific
explanation of the discovered world and also provides descriptive meaning. Though
the meaning of history is discoverable (at least initially) within the age only on the
terms of the received world-view, it is memory, life-experience and the intellect
together that serve to create intelligibility of reality; the historical world is an
intelligible system of universals representing the existential interconnectedness of
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life.
But here we see that Dilthey does not directly answer the problem of what the
common world is outside of the cogency that we bring to the world. Instead he
answers that we should not have expectations ofdiscovering any other cogency. That
is, each historical age has certain tools of the age to explain and describe itself, each
ofthese explanations and descriptions can not be compared against a central truth, for
truth does not ultimately exist outside of the objectification ofmind. Thus historical
anarachy does not remove the possibility for truth as much as change the
requirements of what truth can be for us; truth is relative and conforms to the
boundaries of the historical age. There is no transcendent property which can direct
world history divorced from human determination: truth unfolds as history advances.
Thus the question ofhow we can connect with other people who presumably also
escape historical anarachy by retreating into their particular objectification of mind
remains problematic for Dilthey. Ultimately there appears to be no indisputable truth
that exists between two people who meet and discuss, apparently, common
experiences. Yet Dilthey would not want to remove the possibility of meaningful
interaction between two people, and he furthermore points to a nexus of an age. It
is the genius of an age who is able to combine the various unitary viewpoints into an
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inner core, around which interpretations are able to revolve. Mutual understanding,
that is a common world, reveals itself in the connections that appear to those who
orbit around this central core, and who in so doing participate in a national or
temporal unity surrounded by a flux of possible interpretations. None of this,
however, allows for any certainty in once and for all describing what this central core
is, nor since we can not ultimately agree on what it is, what it will look like in the
future.
A further problem with Dilthey's view is that it neither raises nor answers the
question of a human's fundamental structure, which is the basis of all interpretation
and thus is needed to allow for the possibility ofhistorical understanding. His stated
position regarding a possible science ofhistory reinforces his assertions regarding the
unity of historical spirit. This spirit, which finds expression in many sub-sets of the
human studies, means nothing outside of the manifold of human descriptions, and
since all descriptions have nothing 'fixed' to compare itself to, each equally reflects
a cogent assessment. Thus a general philosophy of history is precluded as a
description of what historical movement 'means', for meaning arises individualy out
of human reflection. But there remains a possibility of a philosophy of history in an
explanatory form, using a merely scientific approach - ignoring meaning and
concentrating rather upon cause and effect, substance and force.... This however
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leaves a philosophy of history cold and lifeless, like mass produced art. A rich
philosophy ofhistory involves the whole human condition, and thus requires a more
thorough examination of a person's fundamental structure.
We will see in the following chapter that for Heidegger a critical understanding
of historicality involves an ontological determination both of the human and of the
Being of history. That humans derive historical meaning from a lived experience
within an "objective mind" does not answer why this happens nor how it is
constrained. Equally we do not see that Dilthey has explained what history is, to be
so sent and incorporated into the lives of humans. Both of these issues reveal that
although Dilthey raised the spector of historical anarachy, he left the job of
reestablishing truth somewhat unsettled. We can claim that there is a common
historical world that has a nexus around which interpretations hover like bees around
a flower, but if all interpretations are individual, must we agree on what is or has
historically been out there stimulating such descriptions.
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Chapter 2
Dilthey raised the issue that all knowledge is necessarily historically situated. By
questioning the certainty of all knowledge, truth as eternally knowable likewise
became suspect. It thus became critical to determine a means by which humans can
rise above this historicism and derive meaning. Dilthey thinks that we must
acknowledge the distinct character ofhumanistic to scientific understanding, in order
to calm historicist concerns and free knowledge from historicist bonds. Accordingly,
we must "describe" in a totality not merely "explain" in a hierarchy. However, this
totality of thought, the "objective mind", is neither sufficiently grounded in what it
means to be human nor how this world constitutes itself as historical. In other words,
it is not sufficiently explained why all other disciplines of study remain beholden to
history. That is, why is all human thought subject to an historical analysis? In this
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chapter we will examine Heidegger's responses to Dilthey's analyses of the role of
history in the foundation of the human sciences as well as the historical factor in
human understanding. We will, at the same time, aim at elucidating Heidegger's own
analysis ofhistoricality.
Martin Heidegger refers to two possible determinations of history. History as
Geschichte is that which we live through, the very manner in which things occur.
This is distinguished from history as Historie which is the story that humans tell of
their experience, the recounting of events recorded in books, the story of our past or
a chronicle of thought.29 According to the later Heidegger, we all live within the
"sending" of Being, whose yielding of itself raises questions of central importance.
Thus in order to understand Heidegger's philosophy of history, we must orient
thinking based upon his convictions of the importance of fundamental ontology and
the notion that Dasein is the one who is primarily historical. And thus this chapter
will show that an understanding of history, which is always revealed in a process of
interpretation, is established, partly, on the basis ofDasein's possibility for making
Geschichte its own as authentic history, or making Historie its own as pre-thematic
history.
29Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans J. Macquarrie &
E.Robinson (San Francisco: Harper-Collins, 1962) ft. p. 30.
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Historiography is firmly rooted in the human world, for only in this realm does
human interpretation carry any sway. Accordingly, we can surmise that any
philosophy, or science, of history must be directed to the human realm, or Historie,
and not towards Being itself in the totality of its yieldings. For Heidegger, Being, in
all its multifarious sendings, underlies all meaning and is never completely captured
by any single interpretation. We could say that the question of the meaning of Being
can always be raised independently of the historical era. We cannot formulate a
science ofhistory upon something that is not itself historical but which is instead the
very ground of history. Our thrownness into an historical world opens for analysis
the constant possibility of Being, but it also reveals the possibility for an historical
and scientific understanding of that world.
Heidegger regards the usefulness of a science of history with caution. Charles
Bambach, in his book Heidegger, Dilthey and the Crisis ofHistoricism30, argues that
part of Heidegger's project was to provide a corrective to the various crises of
historicism and relativism that nineteenth century thought precipitated. Cartesian
subject/object thinking forced a definition of history as something 'past' leading to a
metaphysics ofhistory into which an historian must 'immerse' himself to understand
30Charles Bambach, Heidegger« Dilthey and the Crisis of
Historicism p.255.
35
the facts of history. Bambach suggests, quite rightly, that for Heidegger historicality
is grounded in Dasein and thus precludes such 'facts' of history. The consequent
denial ofthe possibility for primordial inquiry with scientific practices is based on the
lack of a ground that such a science requires.
Heidegger would argue that because temporality and thus historicality resides in
the very essence of who we are, metaphysical historiography will never reach the
Being of "our" history. Furthermore, in critizing the historicism of Dilthey,
Heidegger charges that historicism is the "clearest symptom" that historiography
endeavours to alienate Dasein from its authentic historicality, and therefore from its
very Being in its historical Being-there. Heidegger was in full agreement with Count
Yorck Van Wartenburg, who claimed that scientific and methodical knowledge in
cancelling each other, have cancelled modem man's opinion of himself; preparing
him for burial! Heidegger challenges historiographical reduction:
The question of what man is must always be taken in its
essential bond with the question of how it stands with
Being. The question of man is not an anthropological
question but a historically meta-physical question. (The
question cannot be adquately asked in the domain of
traditional metaphysics which remains essentially
'physics'. )31
31Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph
Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) p. 140.
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For Heidegger, then, the important questions - those about Being or humans - cannot
be answered from within a scientific framework. Science is contained within itself
and can not illuminate its own foundations. Science qua science is not ontological
but if it tries to explain its foundations, it then becomes metaphysics. Thus any
science of history, or philosophy of history, can only provide limited information
about our Being, at the best of times.
Nevertheless Heidegger says, in Introduction to Metaphysics, that we can reach
an "advanced state of knowledge" if we treat as an object "the historical relation
between our historical being-there and history".32 Again in an essay on Nietzsche he
says that, "Prepatory thinking must move from time to time in the sphere of the
sciences; for the sciences in manifold ways, always claim to give the fundamental
form of knowing and of the knowable...An education in thinking in the midst of the
sciences is part ofprepartory thinking and its fulfilment. "33 Moreover, the very title
of section 76 of Chapter 2 Division 2 of Being and Time refers to the source for a
science of history as "Existential", that is, the ontological structure of Dasein' s
32Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 43.
33Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: \ God is Dead'" in
Question Concerning Technology trans. W. Lovitt, (New York: Harper
& Row, 1977) p. 56. Hereafter referred to as (N p. 56.)
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existence. Conseqently, we will begin the study of history with factical Dasein as
Being-in-the-world, and any consequent historiographical disclosure of history has
its ontological structure rooted in the historicality of Dasein.34 In relation to
historiographical thematizing, (to thematize is to create an object for specific study),
Heidegger specifically mentions the "cultivation of hermeneutical Situation".
Overall, by distinguishing the limits of a science or philosophy of history,
Heidegger's view of historicality should become more clearly outlined.
In addition to a hermeneutical consideration of Dasein's historicality as its
ontological structure (to be discussed below as care), Heidegger also says that "for
the most part it is only through traditional history that historiography penetrates to
what has-been-there itself" .35 Thus the theme of historiography "as the possibility
which has been factically existent" can be traced through the interpretations that
history itself has received within its own history, that is, hermeneutically. Next we
will examine the first case, namely Dasein's ontological structure described by
Heidegger as care and discover its meaning as temporality in order to trace its
connection with Dasein's historicality. Heidegger's treatment of Seinsgeschichte in
34Being and Time p. 444. I have retranslated the word
historilogical to historiographical to reflect the current usage,
although in every case the two are entirely synonomous.
35Ibid., p. 448.
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his later works will be examined in the next chapter.
In Being and Time, Heidegger stresses the importance of raising the fundamental
question of the meaning ofBeing. Heidegger focuses his attention in addressing this
question to that entity in whose Being that Being is constantly an issue, that is,
Dasein (There-being). Dasein's self-understanding derives from projecting itself
upon its own potentiality-for-Being. Dasein thus finds itself already-ahead-of-itself
as falling alongside things ready-to-hand within-the-world. This Being of Dasein
Heidegger calls care. The unity ofthe ontological characteristics means that Dasein,
"exists as factically falling" .36 But this equiprimordiality ofDasein's Being as care,
i.e., as Being-ahead-of-itself(existing), Being-already-in (facticity) and Being-along-
side (fallenness), is never complete.
Heidegger defines ontological meaning in human understanding as follows.
"Meaning" provides the basis upon which "understandibility maintains itself", and
is where the projection of Dasein can formulate terms to understand the possibilities
within its existing. When viewed authentically, Dasein anticipates resolutely its
future possibilities as possibilities and then lets itself come toward itself in these
possibilities. Heidegger calls this primordial phenomenon the "future as coming
36Ibid., p. 235.
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towards" .37 This futural anticipation in order to authentically take over its
thrownness, requires Dasein as "it already was". Finally, anticipatory resoluteness as
the mode ofauthentic care which discloses the "there" is concerned with the factically
ready-to-hand entities: "The ahead-of-itselfis grounded in the future .. .'Being-already-
in' [has the] character of 'having been'.. .'Being-alonside' becomes possible in making
present... The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality".38 Thus
Dasein is essentially temporal and care expropriates the future to make the present.
For Heidegger, the historicality ofDasein is just a more concrete working out of
temporality: "Dasein exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal
in the very basis of its Being" .39 And since we have shown above that care is
grounded in temporality, we can then provide an analysis of care in terms of
historicality. But before we do this it would be appropriate to clarify what exactly
Heidegger means by temporality.
Dasein exists temporally, and yet its temporal existence is a unity projected from
within the structure of care. Heidegger's idea of primordial temporality is not one
37Ibid., p. 372.
38Ibid., p. 375.
39Ibid., p. 428.
40
of "time that goes on" but one that maintains that primordial temporality is finite. 40
All conceptions of time as "infinite", immanent or transcendent, are derived from
primordial temporality. The problem for Heidegger is, "...how inauthentic
temporality arises out offinite authentic temporality, and how inauthentic temporality
as inauthentic, temporalizes an in-finite time out ofthe finite" .41 Accordingly, we can
regard authentic historicality as finite.
For this reason, the moments of Dasein's life ordinarily appear as singular
moments connected together to form a whole. Heidegger argues that Dasein does not
fill up a "stretch" that avails itself present-at-hand, but according to a finite
conception ofprimordial temporality "[A]s long as Dasein factically exists, both the
'ends' [birth and death] and their 'between' are, and they are in the only way which
is possible on the basis ofDasein's Being as care" .42 An ontological clarification of
the connectedness of life can be determined in "the way", in the movement, ofDasein
stretching itself along and being stretched along. This process of "historizing" is
grounded in a "specific temporalizing oftemporality"; one that gives Dasein a "self-
4°Ibid., p. 378.
41 Ibid., p. 379.
42Ibid., p. 426.
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constant" way ofBeing.43 Thus an analysis ofcare within the historicality ofDasein
leads from a discussion of the temporalizing of temporality to a historizing of
historicality. Dasein exists within a finite temporal horizon which already connects
its birth and death, and so allows it to regard other factical things as either sharing its
own temporalization or not. Thus we can see that as Dasein exists factically
alongside other things, which are assessed as historical, these things can provide the
backdrop for either an inauthentic understanding of history as something present-at-
hand (history as a series of moments all connected) or an authentic understanding
which regards history finitely, as a "recurrence of the possible" .44
In the words of Charles Guignon,45 Dasein's fundamental historicity
(Geschichtlichkeit) is the structure ofhappening within which Dasein 'manifests', in
action, what it is. In response to Habermas' "decisionist" critique of Heidegger' s
human Being, Guignon's coins the term "manifestationist" to better address the
notion of the movement of Dasein within the care structure. As well, this avoids the
metaphysicalizing problem ofpostulating an agent first and then decisions or actions
43Ibid., p. 427.
44Ibid., p. 444.
45Charles Guignon, "History and Commitment in the Early
Heidegger", in Heidegger: A Critical Reader I eds. H. Dreyfus &
H.Hall (Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell, 1992) I pps. 173-185.
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later. What Dasein is, is what Dasein does. Dasein acts temporally and so is
temporal. In order for history to become a science, we must make history a
theme. This raises the problematic that we have identified two histories within
Dasein itself 1) its primordial historicality as a concretization of temporality and, 2)
the within-time-ness of its existence as factically falling. Heidegger says that these
are equiprimordial.46 The issue of Dasein's history as within-time-ness deals with
four significations that Heidegger, in Being and Time, identifies with the common
understanding of history. (i) History as past, can either be present-at-hand or no
longer present-at-hand. (ii) History as the becoming of an epoch. (iii) History as the
totality of entities that change "in time". (iv) History as that which has been handed
down to us. Together these four signify that existent Dasein, as well as Dasein's
Being-with-one-another comes to pass "in time" which is a continuously effective
historizing of the past as handed down. But we need to clarify both the historizing
of Dasein as 'subject' of these events and explain the historizing of the events
themselves.
To do this we should ask how Heidegger explains Dasein finding artifacts from
the past when it is only Dasein that is primarily historical? Heidegger answers this
46Being and Time p. 429.
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by pointing out that the world also has an historical kind of Being because it is an
"ontological attribute of Dasein" .47 We must be careful to distinguish between the
'past' in terms of equipment that belongs to the 'past' and "one's having been" as
constitutive for the unity ofDasein's temporality. This manifestation of the unitary
temporality that in care is described as "ahead-of-itself as already-alongside". The
brute presence of things from the 'past' allows for the strange question to be asked:
"Why is it that the historical is determined pre-dominantly by the past?"48 In other
words, we could ask why could there not be 'historical' equipment from Dasein's
future? Because of the character of "having-been" which "temporalizes itself
equiprimordially with the Present and the future..." could we not expect things in-the-
world to conform to this way of Being? Heidegger points out that 'historical entities'
do not increase their historicality by being placed further back in time, and thus
treating these entities as "in [a moment of] time" is incorrect. Ultimately, Heidegger
thinks that their temporality (historicality) is so primordial that its ontological essence
does not allow of such temporal manipulations. It appears that although items
(entities) must conform to the temporal structure of Dasein to be understood as
historical or futural, it is not necessary that they have an identical way of Being,
47Ibid., p. 433.
48 Ibid., p. 433.
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which may be contrasted with the "self-Constancy" ofDasein.49
Heidegger calls these historical entities "secondarily historical"; otherwise called
"world-historical" entities.50 In their brute factuality they remain the "plaything of
world-history". But to what extent are these entites encountered as having their
historical character, rather than being given their historical status by Dasein?
Heidegger states that, proximally and for the most part, Dasein understands itself in
terms of what it encounters in its surrounding-world (Umwelt).51 Thus any
understanding of possibilites that it projects as Being-in-the-world stems from the
everyday "soil and traffic" ofthe world with which it is in the "swim". One acquaints
oneself and deals with this world and the history of the things and events within it.
As Dasein is never a world-less subject: "The historizing ofhistory is the historizing
ofBeing-in-the-world" .52 Thus everything encountered in the world has already been
discovered as having a history. Heidegger goes on to say two things about the
historizing of the world: first, that world-history essential exists in a unity with
Dasein; and secondly, that which 'happens' to secondarily historical entities "has its
49Ibid. , pps. 369, 381.
50Ibid. , p. 433.
51Ibid. , p. 435.
52Ibid. , p. 440.
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own charcter of movement, and this character has been completely obscure up til
now" .53 Thus it appears that things encountered within the world, because they are
'in-the-world' which is an ontological characteristic of Dasein are historical
independently and in a different sense than Dasein.
We should not be oblivious to the presence-at-hand of things by excluding the
notion that Dasein exists as factically thrown into a world with Others. Dasein,
according to Heidegger, for the most part interprets its possibilities of existence in
terms of the average public way. When Dasein discovers its "throwness" as its
possibility, it then becomes able to accept this possibility "authentically" -- that is, it
embraces the groundlessness of its Being. It is with this "resoluteness" that Dasein
can disclose and then "take over" its factical possibilities in terms of the heritage into
which it has found itself. The resolute possibilities dependent on the public heritage
can be seized and handed down to itself in a "moment of vision", a moment
whereDasein recognizes and accepts its own thereness. Resolute action, struggle and
communication, within a co-historizing Being-with-Others is determinative for the
destiny (historizing) of a community or people. Ultimately, a complete authentic
historizing must involve the historizing ofDasein's complete Being-in-the-world in
53Ibid., p. 441.
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conjunction with Dasein's Being-with Others: "Dasein's fateful destiny in and with
its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein" .54 Dasein is
not alone when it looks back upon its historical being-there, but is immersed in an
ebb and flow of multiple historizing things.
And yet Heidegger says clearly that, "[i]t is not necessary that in resoluteness one
should explicitly know the origin of the possibilities upon which that resoluteness
project itself'.55 While this remark indicates the impossibility for one to fathom the
totality of the historical origins of one's current possibilities, it may startle those for
whom uninformed action is anathema. There seems, at this point, an avenue for
criticizing Heidegger's position. Specifically, one can act resolutely based upon
ideas or possibilities presented by one's generation, but to act resolutely without a
consideration of the historizing of those ideas, while aware that they do have an
historical significance, should cause one more than a moment of anxious self-
reflection: What is the bigger picture of my resolute action? Necessarily, according
to Heidegger, one explicitly repeats a possibility ofBeing in resolve. But in retracing
the steps passed down in co-historical possibilities, meanings thus created will then
54Ibid., p. 436.
55Ibid., p. 437.
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get handed down as heritage, or a ground for destiny, into another's generation.56
Without also striving to know the origins ofone's possibilities, taking resolute action
merely for the sake of demonstrating resolve means nothing more than exchanging
a fleeing into the ontological and 'unkownable origin' instead of fleeing into the ontic
"they" . Resoluteness as authentic behaviour would appear as nothing more than
another type of fleeing, and thus would be inauthentic and thus contradictory.
Charles Guignon speaks of a use for historiography as being a model for authentic
action for Dasein's fundamental task as the preservation and transmission of a
tradition57. Thus it remains critical for Dasein to have a complete understanding of
its own resoluteness which means that it have a determination, as much as is possible,
of the origin of its possibilities, if only to authentically and in good conscience hand
them down.
Since according to Heidegger, Dasein exists within a co-historical historizing of
Others and alongside things, in order that resolute action avoids becoming a mere
fleeing, it is necessary to demonstrate that Dasein can understandingly take over the
history of its generation, which means, it must understand to some extent the origins
of the things within its co-historical world. It is necessary, then, to establish a means
56rbid., pps. 438, 435, 436.
57Charles Guignon, "History", p. 138.
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of historically understanding the origins of the things which determine Dasein's
possibilities.
Some basis for investigating the movement of world-history can be grounded in
various ways that temporality temporalizes. One way that this occurs, ontologically,
is in the "Self-constancy" of the Being of Dasein.58 We can easily see that
temporality does not always temporalize itselfas Self-constant, but, rather, sometimes
as partially constant, randomly, or even evolutionarily. As we saw above, Heidegger
pointed to the movement ofsecondarily historical entities as having its own character;
and in the case of things, the temporalizing of temporality may not be as self-
constant. By investigating and comparing differing temporalizings of temporality
one could formulate a philosophy of history; historical movement is determined by
the temporalizations of those things within the world. Moreover we must recognize
that not only is Dasein's historicality determinative for historiography, but the
historizing of things, events and ideas independently of Dasein help constitute the
historical world of Dasein.
Heidegger considers hermeneutically the possibility of a historiography based on
Dasein's historicality in which, "...remains, monuments...can tum into historiological
58Being and Time p. 427.
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material only because in accordance with their own kind of Being, they have a world
historical character".59 Furthermore, we find these materials only on the basis of the
activity of historical inquiry that pre-supposes these monuments have an "historical
Being towards" Dasein.60 Thus the historical world, as Heidegger describes it, is
composed of only those things that can be revealed to Dasein historically.
Presumably those things which do not allow of themselves an historical Being - if
there are any - will not be noticed by Dasein.
For Heidegger, historiographical analysis arises from the authentic historicality
of Dasein which can be revealed to it only upon that possibility of existence which
is only existent as factual. Thus whatever happened in the 'past' is not factually
determinable as having been actualized. This, I think, means that what Dasein
interprets as a 'past event', cannot be said to have actually been the case (factual), but
only the current interpretation, coming towards Dasein in its futural character, that
holds any meaning. Heidegger says that historiography "can demand of itself' that
it takes its orientation from the facts, "...equipment, of work, of culture, of the spirit,
and of ideas" .61 But if, as Heidegger also states, "the central theme of historiography
59Ibid., p. 446.
6°Ibid.
61Ibid., p. 447.
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is the possibility ofexistence which has-been-there", then historiography is ultimately
a link between "facts" and the possibilities that have-been-there. Without either
current facts or a possibility of existence which has-been-there, we could have no
past. Still these current facts can be seen as just interpretations of past possibilities
(historicism), or just as past possibilities seen in terms ofcurrent facts (anachronism).
For Heidegger the possibility for Dasein's authentic awareness of itself lies within
its factual and given possibility - this is the fundamental truth discoverable regardless
of any particular historical interpretation. The past is not only a possibility for
Dasein, it is a necessary part of its interpretation of the disclosure of its world. With
that in mind, it is also safe to say that the past, as Dasein conceives it, represents not
any factical happening, but rather is a projection ofpossibilities for meaning upon the
secondarily-historical things that disclose Dasein's world. Every philosophy of
history should not seek to define the possible as only the really factually existing, nor
should it concentrate on the particular historical situations versus universal
movements, but should investigate how Being has yielded itself in the emergence of
possibilities in general for Dasein.
Before ending the discussion of Heidegger' s early analysis of historicality, an
observation of the difference between particulars and universals seems in order.
Historiography, as Heidegger describes it, is concerned neither with particular
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historical events nor with universal determinations, but with the "possibility that has
become factically existent". Particulars on the one hand, especially those of
particular 'past events', can neither form any type of "science" nor allow for an escape
from the determinations of the "they" world. Universals on the other hand, because
they are generally seen as transcending both "in-time-ness" and history, serve no
better as a basis for a science of history. We view our thrown world, at any given
time, as having a past only because we are temporal creatures in general and
historical creatures in particular. A study into why this particular or that particular
possibility has occured is a study into our way of having the world historically
disclosed to our understanding. Even though the things in the world of the current
possiblity must allow for an historical interpretation to be placed upon them, this
interpretation does not exhaust their meaning, thus a descriptive universality does not
consume the particularity of its Being.
Thus in conclusion, in Being and Time Heidegger points to a context (totality) of
equipment ready to hand out of which an individual item shows itself. Each
individual item thus indicates that the context of equipment "has already been
discovered" by Dasein.62 In Division II Chapter 5 section 76 entitled "The existential
62Ibid., p. 98.
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source ofhistoriography in Dasein's historicality", Heidegger suggests that an artifact
that is encountered as an antique signals that the world of its context of equipment is
no longer. But this does not mean that this artifact has its own 'world', but rather, that
Dasein's interpretation of that artifact is such that it discloses Dasein' s world as a
historical world of historizing things. World-historical entities get their historical
character because they belong to the world - to Dasein's world - and to the extent
that the world of Dasein historizes, the things within it also historize. Yet, the
manner in which they historize is only partially dependent upon the historicality of
Dasein; they have their own historicality. Books, buildings, ideas have their own
history, and their continuation depends upon Dasein's world and yet the continuation
ofDasein's world depends upon the seeing historical things within it as present-at-
hand and ready-to-hand, and not as 'something that is past'.63
Going part way to overcome Dilthey's historical anarchy and alienation,
Heidegger by seeing historicality in the very Being ofDasein has removed history as
something that keeps Dasein separated from where it actually is (its Being-in-the-
world). Dasein can no more be detached from its historical world than to be detached
from itself. Dasein is, in some way, the march of history itself. Any movement of
63Ibid., pp. 432, 440-41.
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history is a movement of Dasein and problems stemming from the historical
situatedness of truth is a problem internal to who Dasein is: Dasein exists as
historical. In the next chapter we will look at Heidegger's response, in his later
works, to the problem of truth and historicality which will go far in exposing the
relation ofDasein to historicalized truth.
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Chapter 3
Heidegger raises the issue of historicality in Being and Time primarily from the
standpoint of Dasein. From this direction, history appears to Dasein as a function of
its ontological condition of Being-in-a-world in conjunction with Dasein's
temporality within the care structure. As a consequence of the world's interpretation
across a temporal/historical horizon, things which are disclosive ofthat world are also
seen as historical. Heidegger's project in his middle and later works is still a matter
of contention among modem commentators and this chapter will not go into the
details ofthis contentious issue of the 'tum'. Rather by forging ahead into an analysis
of Heidegger' s later approach to the question of history and historicality in general
we hope to show that the question ofhistoricality is not exclusively approached either
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from Dasein's ontology or from Being itself: both approaches serve to manifest
historicality. Serving as a template for this chapter will be that whereas in the earlier
works the question of historicality is, for the most part, exposed as a function of the
ontological structure ofDasein, the later works seem to move towards an exposition
ofhistoricality as the history of Being, Seinsgeschichte, in terms of the totality of its
sendings.
Heidegger's works which followed Being and Time betray both stylistic and
content differences from this chief work. Reflecting upon the relevant insights from
these middle and later works, namely, Introduction to Metaphysics, Origin of the
Work of Art, "Metaphysics as a History of Being", Nietzsche Vols. I and II and On
Time and Being, this chapter will attempt to show that Heidegger's conception of
Dasein's historicality is ultimately related to the so-called "sending of Being". In
these works, Heidegger avoids a solipsitic subject-ism, for Dasein's inherent
historicality is included within the unfolding ofBeing. In these later works, Dasein's
Being-in as a Being-with (others) and Being-alongside-things is approached not from
the standpoint ofDasein's current understanding but from the totality of a yielding
of Being.
Heidegger's profound insight into the concept of truth is that truth happens as a
strife between concealing and revealing. Aletheia, the unconcealment, in essence
56
(that which holds open and preserves itself) is a process and not static. He describes
this unconcealment in the Origin of the Work of Art:64 "The unconcealedness of
beings - is never a merely existent state, but a happening". Simultaneously with the
giving of itself which, ultimately through Dasein, reveals a world, Being conceals
other ways of revealing itself. This is definitely not to say that Being is something,
but that Being is providing the grounding for whatever does show itself. The totality
of any given sending is capable of providing any historical period with evidence of
Being, which in the history of thought has either been conceived as the most empty
or the most important of concepts. In terms of his earlier thinking, the meaning of
Being is visible in an examination of one's own historical world in a moment of
"fateful repetition" which discloses the "thrownness of the there" as a constant
possibility.65
According to Heidegger's vision of ancient Greece, one such moment of fateful
disclosure happened when the ancient Greek questioning process brought Western
thought out of the darkness of concealment into the light of awareness. Greek artists
and sculptors, statesmen and poets, created a world based on experiences of the
64Martin Heidegger, "Origin on the Work of Art" in Poetry,
Language, Thought, trans. A.Hofstadter, (San Francisco: Harper &
Row, 1971) p. 54.
65Being and Time p. 443.
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wonder of Being.66 With and through various descriptions of the nature of Being, in
the form of culture, the polis was established. In a practical sense it is within the
polis that a world can be seen to exist: existentielly the polis reveals the "there".
Citizens depend upon the polis; for without such a clearing, where truth can be seen
and discussed, people would not come together as citizens, that is they would not
constitute a people within a world in an historical time. For Heidegger, the polis is
needed as the place where history can and must take place, and it is within the polis,
from within a culture that we can think in concrete terms about Geschichte and
Historie. 67
Mirrored in the conflict of Being is the conflict within the human who exists
either within the polis or is occasionally thrust outside of the polis, becoming apolis.
By escaping the polis we escape the confines of a particular historical world and we
can possibly approach the ground of experience, the constant possibility of Being-in
a "there". From this apolis perspective - a quasi-historical vantage point - we can
glimpse the chaos of the abyss over which we as human Beings create order.68
Heidegger maintains that with such formulations we neither change the history of
66Introduction to Metaphysics p. 152.
67Ibid., p. 152-53.
68Ibid., p. 152-53.
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Being nor do we make it, rather, with our participation within a polis, we are
experiencing the living out ofthe history ofBeing. First aware ofour position within
the unfolding ofhistory as a member of a polis, then by stepping outside of the rules
of the public world, that is outside of the pre-thematic (pre-conceptual) history of the
public "they", we assert ourselves as the ones who can speak about Being. In this we
can see a parallel with Guignon's "manifestationist" conception of Dasein as being
what it does. Here Being is manifested in the action of the sending of historical
epochs. And by stepping out of a polis we create a conflict between the ordinarily
known and the extraordinary unknown, impelling the question ofBeing to appear the
ultimate ground of the manifest (polis) or the not-yet manifest (apolis).
Another approach to the abyss over which we create truth, or live out the history
ofBeing, we find described in Heidegger's assessment ofNietzsche. In Heidegger's
words, Nietzsche says that truth fulfils a ne~essary practical function allowing
humans to remain alive.69 Human life will secure its vitality in a system of value
relations. Nietzsche states: "We have projected the conditions of our preservation as
predicates ofBeing in general" .70 Underlying valuation, which for Nietzsche involves
69Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche vol. I I I, ed. David Farrell
Krell, trans. Joan Stambaugh & D.F.Krell & Frank A. Capuzzi (San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987) p. 55.
7°Ibid., p. 61.
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the setting of conditions in the broadest sense, we "transpose truth to life itself as a
necessary condition of life".71 Despite efforts to free truth from the static bonds of
an eternal and bring it down into a world of 'becoming', Heidegger thinks that
Nietzsche remains well entrenched in leaving truth under the sway of beings, though
recognizing them as in a state of becoming.
Contrarily, truth in the sense ofalethia belongs for Heideger in the realm ofBeing
-- not merely of beings. What is for Heidegger the mark of Western metaphysics, is
that even when Being is conceived as the power over beings, Being is still seen as "in
service to beings, just as every power is dependent most of all upon what it
overpowers".72 Further entrenching metaphysics in Nietzsche's thought is that while
maintaining focus on beings, Nietzsche extinguishes the opposition of Being and
becoming which was for Plato so important by making Being a Being of becoming.
Nietzsche, Heidegger states, has decided upon the truth ofbeings with a domineering
anthropomorphism that reduces truth to a condition of the survival of vital life; the
age of consummate meaninglessness begins; meditation on Being "can only remain
in default".73 Being is now dependent on the self-enhancing becoming of will, and
71Ibid., p. 64.
72 Ibid., p. 7.
73Ibid., p. 174.
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of human preoccupation with things.
Heidegger, in Being and Time, likens Nietzsche's categorization of the three
types of history with his notion of the temporality of care. First, "monumental
history" allows humans to open themselves to the 'monumental' possibilities of the
past. Then by thus seizing the past one is at the same time creating the possibility of
reverently preserving the "antiquarian history" into the future. And finally "critical
history" allows an understanding of the possibility that has disclosed itself in the
today.74 Thus historicality for Heidegger exists projecting out of a present, in as
much as whatever is historical shows itself from out of the open of the present. Thus
we can see that although Heidegger makes use of Neitzsche's thought, he neither
accepts the determination of the Being of history as a thing dependent upon an
axiological system and beings, nor that a concrete history as represented in
monuments exists independently of the ontological temporality of Dasein. Rather,
we can plainly see Heidegger's determination ofthe centrality ofBeing, which allows
these factual monuments to be present for Dasein, over Dasein' s horizon of
temporality (historicality).
As mentioned in the introduction to the previous chapter, one way in which
74Being and Time, p. 448-49.
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Heidegger approaches the question of the historicality of Being is with an analysis
of the history of Being. Heidegger maintains in the essay, "Metaphysics as History
of Being"75 that the entire project of Westem metaphysics since the time of Plato and
Aristotle has been a forgetting of the primordial questioning of Being. To probe the
earliest thought about Being, Heidegger returns to the works of Heraclitus and
Parmenides with a close and rigorous etymological examination. Heidegger contends
that the conflict between revealing and concealing, between the ordinary and the
unknown, was not yet reduced into a regressive materialism but still asked why there
is what there is. Such a question returns in Leibnitz' "Why is there something rather
than nothing", and is used by Heidegger as a basic question for philosophical
thinking.76 According to Heidegger, Plato fell away from such basic questioning
with his metaphysical postulation of an ideal world. This retrenchment which
stresses the 'whatness' of things, excluding the 'howness' or 'whyness', has served to
concretize beings and make Being merely a (forgotten) issue. Later transformations
through Roman, Christian, and modernist phases, have highlighted the nihilist basis
of such exclusionary concentration upon 'whatness'. Specifically, by always
75Martin Heidegger, "Metaphysics as the History of Being", in
The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper &
Row, 1973).
76Leibni tz, in "Metaphysics as History of Being", ftn. p. 42.
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searching for a 'what' behind every question about existence, answers like those of
God or the world ofperfect forms, necessarily invite a negative or nihilistic counter-
response. History, in its common modem formulations has stressed this 'ideal place'
within which humans live and with which one must imaginatively return in order to
capture the truth that then existed.77 It has been Heidegger's project to dispel a
metaphysical construeal of history.
Thus it is important for an hermeneutical investigation into the central theme of
historiography to delve into the history of metaphysics generally and analyze
Heidegger's standpoint concerning the end of Western Philosophy. In his essay
"Metaphysics as History of Being", Heidegger contends that "truth" in the writings
ofHeraclitus and Parmenides was not contingent on human subjectivity, but was the
unconcealing (aletheia) of Being in the appearance of things. At this time, before
logos became propositional, the Being ofthings lay bare (logoi) a clearing that Being
lit, an "open" where things could be seen. It is the seeing that determined truth, not
understanding or inconvertibleness. That is, there was no appeal made to an
authority above and beyond the facticity of the presence of things, there was no
obvious reason to question from some standardized viewpoint. This was a time when
77R.G.Collingwood, Idea of History, (London: Oxford University
Press, 1982).
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"appearance,just as much as appearing, belongs to the essent ...This appearance is not
Nothing. Nor is it untrue. "78 Heidegger called this the 'Great Age ofGreece' because
it accepted that the power of the moment provides real knowledge about the
experience of existing: for the ancient Greeks, beings gave adequate information
about Being. Truth is inherent in Being, and thus truth appears insofar as something
IS.
Heidegger maintains that Plato, responding to the seemingly contradictory
sayings of Parmenides and Heraclitus, metaphysically redirected the course of
philosophical thought, hiding the deeper questions about Being in favour of
superficial clarifications on a particular sending of Being. Plato mistakenly detected
a crisis of truth. Are things and thus truth ever-changing (i.e., Heraclitus) or does
nothing change (i.e., Parmenides)? Plato, reacting to the problems of sensory
perception, linked truth with the unchanging - that which can not be fooled by mere
appearances.79 Because everything on earth changes, the unchanging was not on
earth and so consequently it therefore existed only in a suprasensory world ofperfect
78Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 105. Translator Manheim
translated being (s) as essent (s) and Being as being. To keep
consistency with the rest of the works cited, I will in all my
references to 'essent(s)' use being(s) and to 'being' use Being.
79Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 97 & "Metaphysics as History
of Being" p. 8.
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forms. With Aristotle's establishment of propositional logic as the arbiter of truth,
truth had indeed changed from its Pre-socratic form. As an indication that people
were satisfied with this way of thinking, Heidegger quotes Kant's comment that
"since Aristotle [logic] has not taken a single step backward" but,"that it has also
been unable to take a single step forward to this day and thus to all appearances
seems to be concluded and complete".8o Thus for the posterity of Western
metaphysics, truth meant that appearance must be tempered with 'rational' and
'Idealized' thought.
Tracing back the progress of ideas provides a glimpse into the different
possibilities that Dasein could find itself in, and out ofwhich it could and did choose
its disclosure ofworld. These beginning transformations ofWestem thought are only
the first of many transformations. The presencing of Being has since come to show
itself, according to Heidegger, as the hen, the unique unifying One, the logos, Idea,
ousia, energeia, substantia, actualitas,perceptio, monad, as objectivity, as the being
posited of self-positing in the sense of the will of reason, of love, of the spirit, of
power, and finally "as the will to will in the eternal recurrence of the same".81 What
8°Introduction to Meta~hysics, p. 188.
81Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972) p. 7.
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we now call 'Being' provided the basis for these concepts, yet, through this
intellectual process Being itself has remained hidden. Yet in any of these various
transformations of thinking about Being via beings, whether in the Medieval period
which viewed the world as God's creation or the modem world view of the world as
material for manipulation, Dasein remains open to the possibility for historical
awareness of its position within a particular disclosure of Being's sending.
What we see emerging from this analysis is that Dasein's ontological historicality,
thus temporality, is linked both to the lived historical world and to Being itself. How
Being is conceived, the truth of Being, is affected by the ideas of the polis and each
conception reveals truth differently. It is not that there are different truths, but that
the clearing from which Being can be thought about, is changing: this clearing is
historizing. Dasein exists both within this historizing clearing and yet remains the
one who does the historizing. At each moment what can be thought about changes
what Being, in truth, reveals. Descriptions of the "there" as a constant possibility
changes, and in so changing reflects the truth of Being as unconcealedness, which is
a process. The truth of any given description is better described as the happening of
truth that has in this present revealed itself in this way. Dasein is the only "existent"
being who throughout history has the task of forming the bases of questioning and
thus can be regarded as the necessary outgrowth of the happening of truth itself.
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Heidegger wishes to clarify what is and what is not being referred to here. Claims
have been made that metaphysics in all of its various manifestations is merely
'pointing' to the same universal thing or idea. This asserts that metaphysical thinking
is innocuousness in that it denies that the ideas that we use to explain our existence,
to understand or interpret our Being-in-the-world, has any effect on who exists,
namely, Dasein. According to this view, no matter what we say, metaphysically
speaking, the world remains the same and our place within it merely takes on a
different way of dealing with an eternal given:
Even though the linguistic formulations of the essential
constituents of Being change, the constituents, so it is
said, remain the same. If changing fundamental positions
of metaphysical thinking develop on the foundation, then
their manifoldness only confirms the unchanging unity of
the underlying determinations of Being. However, this
unchangingness is only an illusion under whose protection
metaphysics occurs as history of Being.82
Heidegger is challenging us to think beyond the framework of Western metaphysics
constructed over two millennia. Metaphysics, and its basing of truth on the eternal-
unchanging, can only have sprung from the history of the "sending" of Being,
Seinsgeschichte. Heidegger asserts that Nietzsche turned Plato on his head. The
82 "Metaphysics as the History of Being" I p. 11.
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inversion of Platonism where "the sensuous becomes the true, the suprasensuous the
semblant, world"83 leaves to humans only hollow empowering. Specifically,
Heidegger points to an inner unity between Nietzsche's notions the "eternal
recurrence ofthe same" and the "will to power", and that both are symptomatic of the
anthropomorphic revaluing ofall values, that clearly asserts the domination ofbeings
over Being. It is not just that 'When Being lacks the clearing, beings as a whole lack
meaning' but that the ungroundedness of the primordial commencement can not be
preserved in beings. Rather, history begins when the commencement - "which is only
in commencing", is compelled to rest in the abyss of its ungrounded ground. The
truth of Being, as the subject of the primordial question of commencement, "haunts"
the beginnings of history, which remains outside of historical descriptions.
Nevertheless we can make use of the historicality of Being: "The determination
ofman as subiectum and ofbeings as a whole as 'world picture' can only have sprung
from the history ofBeing itself - here meaning the history of the transformation and
the devastation of its ungrounded truth. "84 Thus despite Being refusing itself by
abandoning beings in its historical destruction of all grounds, what is worthy of
question - Being as Being - is lodged in the clearing that Being opens. Keeping this
83Heidegger, Neitzsche, p. 176.
84 Ibid., p.179.
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originary question in the forefront means that mechanical domination, in the form of
a stamp technology or scientific standardization (including historical science), must
be replaced by "unusual and singular things". We can see, therefore, that even with,
and even especially with, the meaninglessness of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence of
the same/will to power, that the end of metaphysics speaks more loudly that ever of
its own demise and of a new commencement.
Following this avenue of thought, what Heidegger is argUIng for is an
appreciation of the mystery of Being. Being is not subject to a single historical
interpretation, but it is only "by grasping what the metaphysics that predetermines the
age has elevated to thought and word" that one can determine what sustains history
and draw nearer to 'what is happening' - namely Being.85 Because humans have a
Being in which Being is an issue they are an integral part of history. Creating and
changing the way that Being's sendings (die Schicken) are interpreted, humans
participate in interpreting the way that, in strictly Heideggerian terms, the world
worlds. Essentially, metaphysics does not reveal its own essence, does not show its
own necessity.
According to Heidegger, nihilism within Western metaphysics repeatedly shows
85Ibid. 1 p. 8.
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itself incapable of showing such necessity by metaphysical means. Whereas a
hermeneutic ofhistorical interpretation shows, if thoughtfully viewed, that Being-in-
the-world as a Being-in-an-historical-world has been manifested differently in
different epochs. Different interpretations do not merely describe the same
manifestation, but different interpretations actually describe specific historical
worlds, which are different ways in which the world has worlded. The structure of
the world-process is the same, the contents of different historical worlds are
expressive of the different possibilities of "the (human) world". Ultimately, we can
only catch glimpes of what is 'happening', of the undercurrent behind the manifold
descriptions. Varying opinions do not negate the veracity of the sendings of Being,
but merely serve to raise the question of the history of the sendings of Being.
Heidegger says that the Being-there of historical man is a "breach" out of which
the power of Being bursts forth making the breach itself smash against the wall of
Being. The "overpowering of Being is confirmed in works [art works or specifically
that which brings about the phenomenon] in which the emerging power physis comes
to light" and in these works Being accomplishes itself as history.86 History is
primarily the destiny of Being. History as a concrete temporal manifestation of
86Introduction to MetaQhysics, p. 159-64.
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Being, is necessary for Being if Being is to have any "there", that is, if it is to be
either concealed or revealed to Dasein. Artworks give evidence of the connection
between the destiny ofBeing as history and the historicality ofDasein's Being-there.
Great artworks center attention upon commonplace articles, and/or historical
monuments, thus showing a human historical world around that entity, revealing how
the artwork and the onlooker (called the "preserver" by Heidegger) gathers and views
the world as an historical people. In such a gathering what is thoughtfully presented
is the presence of that which is presencing - that is, the Being of beings.
Humans can appreciate and understand history as a reflection of their own
ontological foundations, (thus a reflection of Being itselt). But, in order to avoid a
solipsistic-anthropomorphic view of history, they must also see the limits of their
understanding ofhistory and thus ofthe world. Heidegger seems to court a solipsism
when he criticizes the very question of whether the objects of historiography are
"laws" or "events" saying that inaccessible and colourless supratemporal models must
be replaced by objects "already in the factical existentiell choice of Dasein's
historicality".87 However, if it is the capacities of Dasein's understanding which
provide it with historical knowledge of Being, itself and Others, how can we avoid
87Being and Time p. 447.
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falling into a radical subject-ism?
What are these aspects of Dasein's disclosedness or the "there"? According to
Heidegger, Dasein has moodness (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen), and
discourse (Rede) equiprimordially as the constituents of its disclosedness. Language
is regarded as meaning bearing. Thus these aspects can be regarded as the means by
which Dasein articulates meaning to itself, or to others, about the world and about its
historical world.
Heidegger points to those who step out of the polis as the creators ofnew worlds.
These apolis people sow fields with new ideas and bring into history new paths to
discover the unknown alternative fields of understanding. For, according to
Heidegger, it is the case that despite our current and "outworn" nature of truth as
correctness, we nevertheless remain open, and attendent upon the primordial
unconcealedness - for which we need no presuppositions. We stand in a lighted
realm, unthought by us, exposed to the primal conflict of Being which presents to us
something that we apprehend.
When Being thus yields and holds itselfback in the various historical epochs, the
"appropriate" grounds of understanding emerge in each epoch. Thus the aspects of
Dasein's disclosedness shed their solipsistic implication, as their direct connection
with the yielding or holding back of Being in any historical epoch is discoverable by
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an ontological InqUIrer. Heidegger asserts that the appropriate grounds for
understanding exist necessarily within the sending of Being itself.
The inexplicability of the beginning of this revealing and concealing Heidegger
explains, is not a deficiency in our knowledge of history, rather, that the "greatness
of historical knowledge resides in an understanding of the mysterious character of
this beginning".88 Recognizing the grandeur of the beginning, the apolis person
returns to the polis with new ideas that move history forward once these new ideas
are translated into terms favorable to the polis: "The knowledge ofprimordial history
is not a ferreting out of primitive lore or a collection of bones. It is neither half nor
whole natural science but is, ifit is anything at all, mythology".89 For Heidegger, the
appropriateness ofan understanding that humans have about the history ofBeing, one
based upon the secondarily-historical objects such as myth, depends upon the given
historical epoch, "Thinking remains bound to the tradition of the epochs of the
destiny of Being".90 Any given epoch is seen as historical only upon interpretations
of the various temporalizings of temporality which reveal themselves in stories and
in the words that are used in those stories. Art and mythology, equipment and ideas,
88Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 155
89Ibid., p. 155.
90Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 9.
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as well as our perception of factical history are dependent on the ideas which
articulate the changes that arise out of our historicality.
It should not be overlooked that Being does not have a history like a city or a
people have their history. Thus Heidegger says, "What is historical in the history of
Being is determined by what is sent forth in destining, not by an indeterminate
thought up occurrence".91 By this, what is historical in the history of Being depends
upon the appropriateness of what is sent by Being. We can not randomly pick a
transcendent universal or some independent arbiter to decide upon the way that the
history of Being unfolds; we must take our clue from what is already. There is no
other measuring stick against which to determine what the history of Being is, it is
just the way it sends itself.
Interestingly, Heidegger speaks about the absence as a means of explicating the
sending of Being. We can make nothing of this absence if it is a pure absence, but
Heidegger specifically speaks of a "what-has-been" and a "what is to come" as a
letting become present what "is no longer present" and by withholding the present lets
that be present which is "not yet present". Here we have "manifest" the open into
which Being as temporal "gives all presencing into the open". Thus the absence of
91 Ibid., pps. 8 - 9 .
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something from the past lets us clearly see the open of the present, which is open and
waiting for what-has-been, or something else that may presence. Heidegger also
speaks of a giving. The giving that conceals itself, accordingly, is the sending of
Being as time.
But we may not speak of Being as a being; neither may speak of time as a being,
according to Heidegger. Yet how are we to understand the giving of time, which
appears not to be a giving of any-thing at all? Here we must look to the word
Ereignis which denotes an "Appropriation" which when applied to Being and to time,
means that they belong together in that the "destiny, lies in the extending opening
up" .92 Here we seem to have come across a type of equiprimordiality, what I call
'equi-Appropriated'. Time and Being are 'equi-Appropriated'. The sending of Being
is time, and is the clearing in which Being can be seen as historical. But this clearing
is not temporal as in a past, present, future. Rather Heidegger states that this time is
four-dimensional, and the nearing of nearness is the forth dimension of this
ontological time. This nearing of nearness opens by unifying and separating past,
present and future, and it is thus the openness of the presencing of the gift of time-
space. The nearing ofnearness can be seen as a special case of the appropriating of
92Ibid., p. 19.
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appropriateness. Here what is appropriately given to understanding also clears and
opens a place for Being to be described. And just as past, present and future must
remain united but separated by nearness in the giving, in historicality what is
appropriate keeps truth from collapsing into an a temporal static form.
In the openness of time-space, the destiny of Being as the history of Being, is a
double holding back (epoche) of the self-manifestation of both the sending and the
It which sends.93 This obscure double holding back, harkens back to Dasein's guilt
over the facticity of its throwness. Here, instead of finding the destiny ofBeing self-
manifested, we question from where this historical age comes from (metaphysics),
or how this historical epoch appeared (fundamental ontology), or even ethical
judgements on the goodness of such appearances. Moreover because no-thing self-
manifests, questions arise over any given interpretation ofwhat appears. Any and all
interpretations must of accord strive to be grounded in something other that what is
manifested as such, and yet there remains nothing other that the manifestations to
look towards for interpretation. Thus interpretations will shift as manifestations shift.
History, as a history of Being, is a shifting of what is appropriate as a grounding for
the interpretations of Being.
93Ibid., p. 9.
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We can draw more parallels between the approach of Being and Time and Qn
Time and Being based upon a methodological option presented in the latter work. In
an attempt to remove obscuring covers, Heidegger suggests that we should not
consider the destiny of Being only in the historical terms presented in Being and
Time but we should instead use the corrective of placing the 'destiny of Being as
history' as a being, and then doing an ontological analysis of the Being of beings as
was done in Being and Time.94 This type of procedure ends treating history only as
an occurrence interpretable on the basis ofDasein's historicality but includes history
itself as a manifestation of Being. Thus if we can see parallels between an
ontological analysis of the history of Dasein and a history of Being, it becomes
credible to see the historicality of Being as a concretization of the temporality of
Being.
Thus by revealing such a relation between temporality and historicality we can
see why there needs to be a space opened for a particular instance ofnearness, a space
for the action of life to take place. By striking a balance between what remains
known and what unknown in any historical epoch, Being yields what is appropriate
for sense to be made of any-thing. In a sense it is like a theatre which opens the
94Ibid. I p. 9.
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curtains while keeping the actors true identity hidden. An historical epoch (holding
back) manifests enough of itself so that some ofwhat is hidden can come to the fore.
But in a theatre there are moments of insight (or boredom) when we forget the play
and instead unmask the actors. Equally there are certain moments when we see our
historical epoch with its pretense of completeness. And in a theatrical performance
when we question its pretense ofcompleteness by unmasking the actor we reveal our
"there" (Sein) ofwatching the performance in destroying for ourselves the flow ofthe
performance. What we lose by unmasking historical beings, leads to a gain of
awareness of the space where the, ultimately ungrounded, performance of history is
played out.
Some historical ages pride themselves on accepting the facticity of their situation
while others look for the hidden grounds of what they see. In this sense, the
fluctuations of history, appearing within the destiny of a nation, depends on what it
deems appropriate. If the question of Being remains hidden from questioning, then
the gift of Being that refuses such questioning moves into the fore. Heidegger states
that what is appropriate is neither "accidental, nor can it be calculated as necessary" .95
It is only by removing the covers ofmany obscuring epochs layered one upon another
95Ibid., p. 9.
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that we can reach the root of appropriateness.
Finally, we should not be content to find a singular source (i.e., historical) for
appropriateness either ontically in any given age or ontologically in the destiny of
Being as history. In the same way, we should not be satisfied with one determination
of nearness. As we know we can be near to something even though we are far away
in distance, and alternatively distant when we are close by. Heidegger's charge upon
the levelling effect of modem technology is that it removes the ability to appreciate
nearness by making everything equally near (as near as the phone!). Ifwe lose the
ability to judge nearness we shall then lose, presumably, the ability to see the space
that nearness provides for us. Equally, ifwe level off the grounds of appropriateness
then history as an articulation of that clearing that holds back a sending of Being will
go unnoticed.
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Conclusion
The preceding exposition ofHeidegger's later formulation ofhistoricality addresses
the problem spelled out by Dilthey as "historical anarchy", which is a recognition that
the historical situatedness ofknowledge precludes deeming any knowledge as certain
and thus as true. And, depending upon one's point of view, this formulation either
changes the problem to a non-problem or exacerbates the problem. Certainty, or
truth, is not a construction dependent upon an historical age for Heidegger, and so
truth cannot be based upon certainty in the sense conveyed by Dilthey. However,
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since according to Heidegger, truth is not constructed but revealed as unconcealment
(aletheia), each historical age has equal ability to uncover truth. Truth is a possibility
of each historical age.
Dilthey's world as the "objectification of life" or the "objective mind" is a
metaphysical conglomeration of the totality of the things and affairs that the human
being confronts. The human, in Dilthey's opinion, is the historical being into which
we "seek inner coherence", but is historical because of an immersion within the
historical world. What any given human decides upon as true in this world, of
course, depends upon the lived experience of the person. The world is nevertheless
filled with things that historically exist. The world's truth is therefore linked with
whatever is decided upon about these things by the participants within that world; and
since there is no outside arbiter for truth truth changes.
We can immediately see the problem that Heidegger would have with this type
of formulation. First, he would argue, Dilthey begins understanding based upon
things and then moves to an understanding of the Being of things. Secondly, he
would agree with Dilthey that Dasein (the human entity) is that which is
fundamentally historical, but not because of its immersion in the historical world,
rather because of its ontological temporality (thus historicality as a particularization
of temporality). Thirdly, the world is not an existent thing outside of the lived
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experience, and thus the objective mind is not existing somewhere waiting to be
discovered and have (various) determinations made about its existence. Rather, one
is so to say endowed "with" an inner view (pre-ontological understanding) of life
already. Finally, truth is not ultimately decideable, either by participants or
otherwise. To claim that truth is and is then described within a historical situation
presupposes that what is true is static and bound and somehow predecided. Truth, the
way that Dilthey conceives it, is for Heidegger found neither inside an historical
world nor outside of it, rather, if it is to be found at all it is discovered as "happening"
in the present ofDasein.
Thus, according to Heidegger, we should not be preoccupied with the different
events and formulations that have appeared over the course ofhistory. It is not a sign
that there is no truth, or that we shall never be able to once and for all decide what
truth is, but that truth reveals itselfvariously in different ages. It is not, because there
are 'truths' of different historical ages and that there is no truth, but that there are
multiple disclosures of truth. What is true is more than one thing, and each age can
appropriately reveal it. Thus one way to view this is that the problem of no truth is
replaced by multiple disclosures. Dasein is described as always in the truth.
But this again is not quite right. In that truth, for Heidegger, is not a static thing
that allows ofa comparison over time-space: to compare the truth of something at one
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historical time to that of another is impossible. For the criteria of what is appropriate
at any given time has also changed in conjunction with the truth, or can we say,
because of it: the world-disclosure that is true is the one that only that disclosed-
world can verify. In other words, what is true for one world-disclosure may not be
true for another.
Heidegger thinks that the foundations of the Greek world "even though distorted
and transposed, covered and concealed, still sustain our world" .96 Thus as inheritors
of a part of this clearing, we have the potential to inquire into the truth that they saw.
Certain ancient Greek concepts, though indeed changed, have managed to keep their
force in disclosing our existence. Each epoch, each generation, preserves the ideas
of its past (monuments), projects them into their future (makes antiquities out of
them) and creates a present (uses them critically to understand its world). What each
generation takes from its past is determined, at least in part, by its "usefulness and
serviceability". This preservation and projection stem from the ontological character
of Dasein as care. According to Heidegger, we have preserved something
metaphysical from the Greeks, projected it into our future in order that the present
contains remnants of the Greek world.
96Introduction to MetaQhysics, p. 125.
83
The dominance97 of certain views, Greek or otherwise, reduce the importance
given to other views. Whether these views, which are disclosive of a world, remain
dominant does not demand that those views are passed along with an understanding
of their original character and may in fact be only empty verbal shells. Thus without
the authentic questioning of Dasein, ideas which disclose our world are not fully
understood as to the nature of the world that is so disclosed. Heidegger would claim
that for the most part we exist inauthentically, that is we do not question the
importance of the ideas that take hold and dominate in the disclosing of our world,
but merely accept the ideas as given. It is incumbent upon Dasein, as that Being who
is fundamentally historical, to investigate the history of the world disclosing
interpretations into which it has been thrown, and to resolutely accept the world as
so disclosed. This type of analysis will also allow for an appreciation of different
ways in which the world is disclosed, ways in which truth reveals itself in the
worlding of the world. If we question into the birth place of our ideas, then we will
become able - not to delimit or define Being - but to see, among other things, the
many possible manifestations that have historically conspired to keep the question of
97Heidegger uses this term repeatedly: "Metaphysics as the
History of Being" pps. 18 & 21 & 67, Introduction to Metaphysics
p.137, "Origin on the Work of Art" p. 39. Being and Time p. 442, &
p. 43 speaks of the 'tradition as master'.
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the meaning of Being hidden!
Heidegger sees two consequences if inattention to the dominance of the ideas that
disclose our world becomes rampant. First, such inattention will allow the current
earth exploiting mentality to become the sole criterion of appreciating the destiny of
Being. We then shall have moved into the age ofthe technological cybernetic, which
reduces everything, including humanity, to mere exploitable beings. Yet, secondly
and surprisingly, total reduction to a metaphysics of beings reveals with more clarity
than is possible with more "ontological" approaches, the concealedness of Being.
This is due to Heidegger's notion that absence can cause what is absent to come
forcefully into the foreground. However for the most part, when time and Being
become 'things' among other things, exploitable by and alienated from humans, the
hidden nature of Being will remain unquestioned, and humans will fall into a
darkness which fails to grasp the depth and mystery of their begining.
In referring to his own ideas and way ofthinking, Heidegger asks whether the true
interpretation is simply the one into which one falls, as self-evident, or is it the one
that actually questions what is needed. Heidegger states that we question positions
that we have clung to "out of historical necessity".98 But the violence that we
98Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 176.
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sometimes do to old interpretations is bound up with how we view ourselves. And
ultimately, by throwing ourselves against metaphysical notions of historicality,
against the comfort of the world of the "they" that craves novelty but not depth, and
by disowning a "past which has become unrecognizable", we can come to see "history
as the recurrence of the possible".99 A return to the ancient Greek idea of truth as
the clearing, would require an "historical meditation" upon the foundation ofWestem
Metaphysics. Thus the idea of truth as a clearing can not be grasped simply by
stating it is a clearing, for like Dilthey, Heidegger recognized that any given
information is contained within the context of its occurrence: "...utterances inevitable
speak out of a background, a background from which they emerge; such utterances
do not explicitly interrogate that background but return to it unwittingly in their very
speech" .100 In other words, what we can determine in language does not reveal the
groundlessness of the 'whatness' of whatever is discussed, in fact just the opposite,
for it must blandly assume it. And yet, if we think deeply or meditate upon what
constitutes truth for us, this process can reveal its self-grounding and expose the
abyss out of which such "a clearing" may have appeared for the ancient Greeks or
whomever.
99Being and Time, p. 444.
lOOHeidegger, Nietzsche, p. 162.
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Although Heidegger did not feel that a science of history could explain the Being
of humans, their place in the kosmos or the rift out of which world is disclosed, nor
did he think that a philosophy of history could determine how Being will represent
itself in the future, he did think that it was valuable in terms of thinking the question
of the "there" of Dasein and the question of Being. Heidegger's limitation may go
too far. Certainly his attack on bland historiography as a recounting of historical
words would prove completely inadequate to the task of exposing what history is,
either Dasein's historicality or the history of Being. But Dilthey also had the same
objections for similar reasons. For Dilthey a science of history is impossible
because first it is a descriptive science dependent upon meanings that the person
receives from experience, and secondly, since any new event completely restructures
a person's description of the 'objective mind' there is no way to create a science of
history which parallels a science of nature. The human sciences are woven into a
whole where each part effects the whole and cannot be systematically unravelled.
The creation of such a world is for Dilthey based on an inherent teleology, which is
perhaps the predecessor ofHeidegger's description ofDasein which discovers things
out of a context of equipment. Thus for Heidegger, the arena for any historical
science is the world ofDasein, which is first revealed in a totality. This world reflects
the sending of Being as a whole, and accordingly any single event is not intelligible
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in exclusion from the entire background. Perhaps Dilthey's "inner core" of an
historical age represents an metaphysical analog to Heidegger's "hiddenness of
Being" which lurks behind any given historical age.
Thus a science of history for both Dilthey and Heidegger would involve an
analysis of the changing totality based upon the change of one part whose change is
only understandable in terms of that changing whole. Any analysis of the change in
terms of that which followed any given change will not be completely sensible in
terms of the background of what existed previously. Thus we indeed run into a
problem of translating an event that happened into terms that are acceptable and
understandable in the post-event environment. Perhaps a science of history will
prove itselfto be an analysis ofthe structure ofrelations that can be only ever roughly
translated into a current context. Since the structure of the background as a sending
ofBeing itself changes over time, this program for historiography does indeed look
challenging. If the Human Genome Project presents a similar feat of imagination,
that of deducing meaning from within a series of relations which remain fluid within
an ever-changing structure, then a recognition of the amount of facts compared with
the amount ofgenes makes the historical project that much more of a daunting task.
This type of relation, of a part which defines the whole which is in turn defined
by the whole is, I think, what Heidegger is pointing to in his dual approach to
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historicality. Specifically, Dasein's historicality is that which is primarily historical,
and yet Dasein is dependent upon the primordial temporality which is co-
Appropriated by Being. Thus Dasein's disclosed Being, as a temporal Being-in-the-
world, is but a manifestation of Being. Furthermore, it is Dasein's description of the
disclosure of its world, that ultimately decides upon the truth of Being; that is, in
what ways the meaning of Being can be questioned and described. Being is
describable only from within-a-world, and that in-a-world is itself ontologically
dependent on Being which allows for a description of that relationship: truth 'is'
nothing other than that description.
The generally understood notion of the common world, becomes void of
solipsistic overtones with Heidegger's pursuit of fundamental ontology. Dilthey left
us with a metaphysical common world understood only by means of individuals,
leaving truth as a battle between competing descriptions. Heidegger grounded the
'world' in the individual, removed truth from the realm of description to the realm of
the experiencing ofBeing, and created a commonality not in "a" Being-in-the-World
but that ontologically we exist as Being-in-the-world as a Being-in-a-historical-
world-with-Others. The truth of the Others can not be proved metaphysically as a
'whatness' ofthe Others, but is rather variously interpreted depending on the historical
epoch. In addition, such truth cannot be contradicted only usurped.
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